## EXHIBIT I

(Case called; in the robing room)

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THE COURT: Mr. Zouras, this is Judge Gardephe.

MR. ZOURAS: Good morning, your Honor. Thank you for allowing me to appear by phone.

THE COURT: I have with me Mr. Nirenberg, and then I have Mr. Kaufman and Mr. Capobianco as well, and we also have a court reporter.

Let me say for the record that this is an FLSA and New York Labor Law claim for unpaid overtime and that the defendant is involved in the business of debt consolidation services. Plaintiff worked in that capacity selling those services, alleges he was not paid in compliance with the law.

Have there been any settlement discussions between the parties? Mr. Nirenberg or Mr. Zouras, have you tried to settle the matter with defense counsel?

MR. ZOURAS: Yes, your Honor. In the process, defense counsel approached us and offered to provide us some data for what was then an individual by the name of Daniel Schur, who brought the case. Subsequently, another opt-in plaintiff joined the case. They offered to provide data for those two individuals, and they haven't done that. We have evaluated it. We appreciate those efforts.

A couple of reasons we can't really engage in meaningful discussions at this time. We have brought the case, as you noted, as a class and collective action, so we would

what we are talking about. Number two, we need to engage in discovery to vet out some of the issues we have raised and some

need to determine, number one, the scope of the class, exactly

4 of the defenses the defendants have raised.

It isn't so much that we engaged in a settlement discussion in terms of making an offer, making a demand, or anything like that. That's a bit premature. But at least we have engaged in a meaningful dialogue to let everybody know where we stand. I think the process was helpful for at least vetting the issues and hopefully narrowing what is really in dispute.

THE COURT: It sounds like this is not a case that is going to settle based on the individual who brought the case or the person who opted in, that if there is going to be a settlement here, it is going to going to have to be on a collective or class basis. Is that what you are saying?

MR. ZOURAS: That is correct, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: Let me ask defendants, do defendants intend to oppose a motion for court-authorized notice?

MR. KAUFMAN: Your Honor, I guess the answer is we may. The reason I'm saying that is we are a little frustrated by this whole process. From the beginning of this case, we have turned over both payroll records and door punches in the building showing when people are coming and going. We have offered to give more information to try to show you that there

1 | is no claim here.

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We've given them all the payroll records for both Daniel Schur and Haldon Bagley. Daniel Schur, the lead plaintiff, we would say arguably owes us about \$60 that we overpaid him. And this other person, Haldon Bagley, we owe 21 cents to. If there are other issues with our payroll keeping, we have tried to rectify them on a weekly basis. There is no issue here.

In fact, I have said this over and over again to plaintiff's counsel, there are two sets of electronic records here. The person cannot work unless they are logged in to their computer. When they enter a building, there is a punch that shows up electronically.

So we are a little frustrated. We have asked for a demand of any sort to try to move this along. We do understand that they have rights to go forward on a collective or class basis. But at some point in time you see enough of these cases and know there is nothing here. If there is some way we could expedite moving this along. We have tried. We have opened our books. Tell us. This is not one of those big cases.

THE COURT: Mr. Zouras, do you believe there is some reason to distrust the accuracy of the records that defense counsel has referred to?

MR. ZOURAS: Yes, your Honor. The fundamental point of our case has always been that the time these folks are

working, in other words, when they are physically at the office and time is being recorded, the defendant at that time is not accurately recording all time worked.

In other words, they who are controlling the timekeeping system are falsely recording time that indicates it is only 40 hours a week or at least just slightly over 40 hours a week, when in reality these folks are working off the clock as many as 50 hours a week.

So, when they now produce data saying, hey, it only shows 40, we paid for 40, hey, it only shows 41, we paid for 41, we already know that is what those records that they are going to show us say. But that's not the point of our case, your Honor.

With respect to the data that apparently came from the building, we have no reason to refute it, to disagree with it. It shows when persons entered the building and exited. We all know about badge light data. When you enter the building, it will show you entering the building. There is no record of when somebody left though. So those records have some value, but those records are also limited.

THE COURT: What I heard from defense counsel is that in order for the person to be working, they would have to be logged on to the computer. What I derive from that is one could tell when someone had logged on and when they had logged off and thereby reliably determine how many hours they had

actually worked. Is there some reason to distrust that?

MR. ZOURAS: I don't know. But that's not the data that we have received, your Honor. What we have received are time record data. That data is not showing, hey, this is when somebody logged in and logged out of the computer. That data may very well exist somewhere. But that is not what we have to date.

MR. KAUFMAN: Your Honor, if I haven't been clear in the past in plaintiff's counsel, then I will clear this up.

That data is all based on when they are on their computer.

When they log off, there is nothing for them to do. They can't make phonecalls, they can't do anything. They have to have the the data in front of them. They have to be logged on.

I just would add that while I do understand that the time swipes only show when somebody is coming, not going, the plaintiff or lead plaintiff in this case averaged leaving or coming into the building six times a day. There is certainly a lot of validity to that time information. I'm not sure what else I can add to this.

as to what the records that have already been produced show.

That suggests to me that it might make sense to take a little more time to understand what has been produced and to make sure that there is reason to believe that people were working more hours than they were paid for.

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It does seem to me, if one accepts what defense counsel has represented, first of all, that an employee cannot do work until they are logged on. That's number one. Point two is there is a record of when employees log on and log off. Just based on that, it would seem that the parties could reach an agreement on how many hours a particular employee worked.

I would suggest that you attempt to reach a common understanding on that point before we go much further unless someone tells me differently, and you are welcome to do so. I would suggest that the lawyers spend another, say, 30 days to figure out whether there is a way to reach a resolution here. If someone is violently opposed to that, say so. Based on what I have seen so far, I think it would be a shame to embark on discovery and motion practice under the circumstances.

Mr. Zouras, what do you say? Are you willing, you and Mr. Nirenberg, to have a few more conversations with defense counsel about these records and what they show?

MR. ZOURAS: Sure. We are happy to do that, your Honor. Again I need to emphasize the point of our discussions and the area of controversy. We have done this for 20 years now, so we understand this and we bring cases like this all the time.

We have seen records that are computer records, log in/log out records, where the human using the computer has to input something to turn the computer on and turn it off, and

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you can get a corresponding record of that. We can bear down, number one, to see if those records have been produced and, if

not, do they exist. We are happy to have that discussion, your

4 Honor.

THE COURT: I would suggest that you take 30 days to do that. At the end of that period, if you are not able to reach resolution, you will let me know, I'll enter a case management plan. The one you have proposed is quite lengthy. Before I would approve any period remotely like that, I would need to understand why a period of 90 or more days is appropriate in this type of case. It is a little bit hard to get a grasp of the case because I have no idea of the size of the putative or collective class. Does anyone here have any idea how many people we might be talking about?

MR. KAUFMAN: I think it is 400 or so. Is that correct? Somewhere in that range.

THE COURT: Do you have any sense, Mr. Zouras, of how many people we are talking about?

MR. ZOURAS: Yes, your Honor. We pegged it at somewhere between 3 to 500 folks, somewhere in that neighborhood. That's under the 6-year New York statute of limitations, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. What I would like you to do is take another 30 days to exchange information, talk about the documents or the computer-derived information that's been

provided. If you are not able to reach agreement on the case.

I'll enter a case management plan at the end of that period.

I'm going to want to know at that point whether defense counsel is going to oppose a motion for the dissemination of court-authorized notice. If so, I want the lawyers to propose a schedule for briefing on that. As everyone here knows, the standard for dissemination of notice is quite low. But if it is going to be litigated we will need to set a schedule for that.

I will need justification for anything like the period of discovery that was initially requested, so that will have to be included. If at any point anyone would like a referral to the assigned magistrate, we have an excellent magistrate judge assigned to the case, Judge Pitman. He is available to you for settlement purposes if at any point you think that would be helpful.

MR. KAUFMAN: Your Honor, if I may add. To verify our records also, we have an affidavit we have given to them from our head of human resources verifying both sets of records that we have turned over. We are trying to move this along.

THE COURT: I hope you can. It is in everybody's interest to bring the thing to a rapid resolution if we can before more time and effort is invested in the case. If you can't, you will send me a letter in 30 days addressing the issue of court-authorized notice, the length of the discovery